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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-1044 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
   v. 
 
JOE DUNSTON, 
                        Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00289-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2010 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 16, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Dunston pleaded guilty to three counts, including conspiracy to commit 
armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and carrying a firearm during and in relation to 
a crime of violence.  Dunston now appeals, contending that his guilty plea was not 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, that his 199-month imprisonment sentence was 
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substantively unreasonable, and that the sentence for the conspiracy count exceeded the 
statutory maximum.  We will affirm the District Court with respect to the first two claims 
and, with respect to the third, direct the District Court to enter a sentence that is within 
the statutory maximum. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 On July 24, 2008, a grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Dunston and his co-
defendants Robert Dales, Dante Toliver, and William Matthews with conspiracy to 
commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and armed bank robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).  They were also charged with carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 On February 4, 2009, Dunston entered into a cooperation agreement with the 
government.  The agreement provided that Dunston would plead guilty to the three 
charges in the indictment.  Further, it explained that the §§ 371 and 2113(d) offenses 
were subject, respectively, to statutory maximums of five years‟ and twenty-five years‟ 
imprisonment and that the § 924(c) offense was subject to a mandatory minimum of 
seven years‟ imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment.  Dunston also agreed to 
waive his right to appeal or present a collateral challenge to his conviction or sentence, 
except in four circumstances:  (1) if the government appealed; (2) if the court sentenced 
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him above the statutory maximum; (3) if the sentencing judge erroneously departed 
upward from the sentencing guidelines; or (4) if the court imposed an unreasonable 
sentence that was above the applicable U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines range. 
On April 8, 2009, Dunston pleaded guilty to the three charges.  At the beginning 
of the colloquy, the District Court asked the following question of Dunston for each of 
the crimes charged:  “[A]re you pleading guilty to the crime . . . because you‟re, in fact, 
guilty of having committed that crime?”  Dunston answered in the affirmative for each of 
the charges.  The District Court then advised Dunston as to: the charges against him and 
the elements of each charge; his trial rights; the rights he would forfeit by pleading guilty, 
including his waiver of the right to appeal; the sentencing process; and the consequences 
of pleading guilty, including the possible penalties for each count.  Dunston stated that he 
fully understood all of this, and at the conclusion of the colloquy, he entered a plea of 
guilty on all counts. 
 On December 22, 2009, the District Court sentenced Dunston for a total of 199 
months‟ imprisonment for the offenses:  115 months for conspiracy, 115 months for 
armed robbery, and 84 months for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.  The 
115-month sentences were to run concurrently, and the 84-month sentence was to run 
consecutively. 
 Dunston now appeals the validity of his guilty plea, the substantive reasonableness 
of his sentence, and the validity of the imposed sentence for conspiracy. 
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II. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  In 
general, “our review of the validity and scope of appellate waivers is plenary.”  United 
States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, we review alleged 
violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 for plain error if “a defendant seeks 
to set aside his appellate waiver based on an unpreserved claim that the district court did 
not conduct an adequate colloquy.”  Id. at 926-27 (citing United States v. Goodson, 544 
F.3d 529, 539 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
III. 
 Dunston sets forth three arguments on appeal.  First, Dunston argues that his guilty 
plea must be vacated because he did not enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily.  Next, 
Dunston contends that the sentence imposed is substantively unreasonable considering 
his criminal history and the disparity between his sentence and another defendant.  
Finally, Dunston alleges that his sentence for criminal conspiracy is illegal and a remand 
is necessary to modify the judgment.  We address each argument in turn. 
 First, Dunston contends that the District Court failed to inform him of the nature 
of the charges against him, the consequences of a conviction, and the constitutional rights 
he waived before pleading guilty.  Dunston alleges that the plea colloquy was ineffective 
because it was given after his guilty plea – claiming that his answers to the initial 
questions raised by the District Court amounted to a plea of guilty for all counts.  In 
response, the government maintains that the District Court gave the plea colloquy prior to 
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Dunston‟s guilty plea and that his plea was made knowingly and intelligently.  The 
government argues that the District Court‟s questions at the beginning of the colloquy 
were appropriate, and Dunston‟s responses did not constitute a guilty plea. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) requires that, “[b]efore the court 
accepts a plea of guilty[,] . . . the court must address the defendant personally in open 
court” and inform the defendant of his constitutional rights, the mandatory penalties, and 
the nature of the charged offenses.  Because Dunston failed to raise an objection in the 
District Court, he must satisfy the plain-error rule.  United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 
(2002); Corso, 549 F.3d at 928.  Dunston “must show (1) that there was an error, i.e., a 
deviation from a legal rule, (2) that the error was „plain,‟ i.e., clear or obvious, and 
(3) that the error affected his substantial rights.”  Corso, 549 F.3d at 928-29 (citations 
omitted).  Additionally, “even if all three conditions are met we will exercise our 
discretion to correct the unpreserved error only if [the Defendant] persuades us that (4) „a 
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result,‟ that is, if „the error seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. at 929 (citations 
omitted).  When analyzing the effect of a Rule 11 error, we may refer to the entire record.  
Id. 
 The District Court did not err.  A review of the record illustrates that Dunston did 
not enter his guilty plea until after the District Court conducted an exhaustive colloquy.  
Before the colloquy, the District Court asked Dunston if the facts recited by the 
prosecutor were correct and if he committed the acts.  The District Court was merely 
inquiring into the accuracy of the factual basis of the plea, and Dunston‟s affirmative 
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answers did not amount to the entry of a plea.  This came later at the end of the colloquy 
when the District Court asked Dunston how he pleaded to each count, and he responded 
“guilty.”  The plea colloquy was adequate because it informed Dunston of both the 
elements and penalties of the offense, as well as the rights that Dunston would be giving 
up by pleading guilty.  The initial questions raised by the District Court were for the 
practical purpose of determining the need for a plea colloquy.  Therefore, we find that 
Dunston knowingly and voluntarily entered a valid guilty plea. 
 Second, Dunston argues that the sentence he received was substantively 
unreasonable.  We decline to exercise our jurisdiction to review the merits of Dunston‟s 
appeal if we conclude:  “(1) that the issues he pursues on appeal fall within the scope of 
his appellate waiver and (2) that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate 
waiver, unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.”  Corso, 549 
F.3d at 927.  Because Dunston knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his 
sentence, his claim fails to meet any of the exceptions to the appellate waiver provision, 
and because a within-range sentence of 199 months‟ imprisonment is not a “miscarriage 
of justice,” we decline to review the merits of Dunston‟s substantive reasonableness 
claim. 
 Third, Dunston and the government agree that the 115-month sentence for the 
conspiracy count is in error because it exceeded the statutory maximum of not more than 
five years‟ imprisonment for an 18 U.S.C. § 371 offense.  For this reason, Dunston‟s 
claim falls outside the appellate waiver, and we must direct the District Court to correct 
the sentence.  Because the District Court ordered this sentence to run concurrently with 
7 
the 115-month sentence imposed for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which carries a 
statutory maximum of 300 months‟ imprisonment, the error did not result in a greater 
sentence than what would have otherwise been imposed.  But because the sentence 
exceeded the statutory maximum, we will direct the District Court to amend its sentence 
in accordance with the statute. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court as to 
Counts Two and Three: the 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 924(c) offenses.  However, we will 
remand to the District Court as to Count One, the 18 U.S.C. § 371 conspiracy offense, for 
entry of a sentence to be not more than 60 months‟ imprisonment in accordance with the 
statutory maximum. 
